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JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH
DOES IT REALLY HAPPEN?
Samuel R. Gross*
It's a familiar image from American fiction: the bad guy ridden out of
town on a rail' or beaten up by the sheriff and dumped on the next train out.
Where do they go? Banishment is an age-old form of punishment. In Amer-
ica, where an atomized criminal justice system has survived into the twenty-
first century, we can continue to try to dump our criminals on our near
neighbors, and-as Doron Teichman points out in his interesting article-
that is not the only way that American states, counties, and cities can try to
reduce their own crime rates by exporting crime elsewhere.3 They can also
adopt policies that encourage criminals to commit their crimes over the bor-
der or to move away entirely.
It makes sense that in a federal system--or for that matter in a global
economy-jurisdictions might compete to become comparatively less at-
tractive to criminals. And it makes sense-as Teichman explains-that they
might do so in ways that primarily displace crimes as well as in ways that
primarily reduce criminal behavior. Teichman discusses several examples:
the spread of "Auto Theft Prevention Authorities" ("ATPAs") in the Midwest
in the late 1980s and early 1990s after the first one was introduced in
Michigan in 1986; 4 the possibility that "three-strikes" habitual-criminal stat-
utes in California and elsewhere drive ex-convicts to move to other states;5
and recent discussions of a possible domino effect across states in the regu-
lation of the sale of pseudoephedrine, a legitimate over-the-counter
decongestant that is a precursor chemical in the manufacture of metham-
phetamine. 6 I will not describe these examples or the structure of
Teichman's argument in detail. There is no point in trying to summarize the
article. It is well written and informative; you should read it.
* Thomas and Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This
Essay benefited greatly from research assistance by Joel Flaxman, University of Michigan Law
School class of 2007. It was supported in part by funds from the Cook Endowment of the University
of Michigan Law School.
1. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 270 (Susan Harris ed., Houghton
Mifflin Company 2000) (1884).
2. UNFOROIVEN (Warner Bros. 1992).
3. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime, Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831 (2005).
4. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1843-47.
5. Id. at 1847-48.
6. Id. at 1848-49.
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My only quarrel with Teichman is over the scope of the phenomenon he
describes.7 In particular, Teichman offers this practice-the "arms race be-
tween local communities attempting to drive crime to their neighbors"--as
a possible explanation for an extremely important change: the extraordinary
increase in incarceration in the United States between 1980 and 2002.' No
evidence is offered to support this claim; on the contrary, the evidence
Teichman discusses points in the opposite direction. I will focus on the in-
crease in the rate of imprisonment. It is not the only indicator of the status of
the criminal justice system that Teichman discusses, but it is the most im-
portant.
Let me start with a concrete example of interjurisdictional disparities in
law enforcement as they operate on the ground in the United States. One of
the distinctive characteristics of criminal justice in the United States is the
use of ordinary citizens as judicial officers, as trial jurors and as grand ju-
rors. Professor Phyllis Crocker of the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
has written a useful and informative article about her personal experiences
as the foreperson of a Cuyahoga County g9and jury in Cleveland, Ohio-a
temporary, part-time, appointive position.' Among other issues, Crocker
describes the reactions of her two predecessors to the treatment of a low-
level drug offense, possession of a crack cocaine pipe with cocaine residue:
"One foreperson was concerned that it appeared that the City of Cleveland
prosecuted these cases as felonies, while the suburbs processed them as
7. Well, not quite my only quarrel. On matters other than his main argument, Teichman
sometimes makes sweeping statements based on thin citations, and some of these statements are
questionable. For example, he says that "in recent years we have witnessed a constant decline in the
procedural safeguards granted to criminal defendants by courts in the United States ...." Id. at
1832. One source cited-an article by Michael Tonry--does say something similar, but offers no
support for the claim. Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?, 45 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 419, 419 (1999) ("Only in the United States are constitutional and other safeguards
of criminal defendants systematically being reduced ...."). The other source cited includes the
observation that "judges have virtually gone out of the business of actually policing the voluntari-
ness of confessions .... Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12
CONST. COMMENT. 207, 209 (1995). However, (i) this is the only item in the article on which Seid-
man makes what appears to be a historical comparison-that is not Seidman's point; (ii) the time
period for the change Seidman describes-before and after the Miranda decision in 1967-is not
the same as the one Teichman focuses on; and (iii) in the last several years there has been a notice-
able trend in the opposite direction: some American courts have become more skeptical of
confessions and more likely to exclude them. See, e.g., Barbara Grzincic, MD. Court of Special
Appeals Reverses Manslaughter Conviction, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, MD), Aug. 17, 2005.
If a recent erosion of procedural rights has had an effect on the phenomena Teichman ad-
dresses, the main determinant-the factor that would affect the fate and behavior of most
defendants-would almost certainly be the decrease in the resources available for criminal defense;
that more than anything determines what safeguards are in fact "granted to criminal defendants."
Teichman, supra note 3, at 1832. I am no fan of recent trends in American criminal procedure, espe-
cially at the constitutional level, but I am not persuaded that in actual practice matters have gotten
systematically worse in the past twenty years. They were not very good to begin with.
I hasten to add that overstatements of this sort, and worse, grace the pages of many law review
articles, including many good ones, such as Teichman's.
8. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1834.
9. Id. at 1832-35.
10. Phyllis L. Crocker, Appointed but (Neary) Prevented from Serving: My Experiences as a
Grand Jury Foreperson, 2 OHIO STATE J. OF CRIM. L. 289 (2004).
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misdemeanors. The other was disturbed by the apparent racial bias of this
practice."" In a footnote, Crocker explains that "primarily African-
Americans face felony indictments in low-level drug possession cases in
Cleveland, while primarily whites face misdemeanor charges for the same
offense in the suburbs." 2
This small vignette suggests several issues that bear on Teichman's
thesis: '3
First, of course, the practice in question-prosecuting the lowest level of
a personal-use drug offense as a felony-is the sort of policy that increases
incarceration rates. Indeed, the cumulative effect of policies like this around
the country could be huge. By way of context, the greatest increase in the
national incarceration rate between 1980 and 2000 was in incarceration for
drug crimes.
4
Second, the disparity at issue was not generated by differences in the
statutes that govern the use of crack cocaine-both Cleveland and its sub-
urbs are subject to the same Ohio state laws-but by differences in the
exercise of administrative (in this case prosecutorial) discretion. The same is
also true, for example, of the ATPA movement. As Teichman describes it,
the creation of ATPAs did not involve any statutory reform in auto-theft
penalties but rather a set of policies to enhance prevention and make auto
theft a higher priority for police officers and prosecutors.
Third, the disparity here is between neighboring local jurisdictions
rather than between states. That too is the most common and important set
of disparities in the American system of criminal justice, for obvious rea-
sons. There are fifty states in the United States, but over 3000 counties 5 and
more than 18,000 separate police forces and sheriff's departments.' 6 As al-
ways, we tend to compare ourselves to our near neighbors; I doubt if it
would have occurred to a Cleveland grand jury foreperson to compare
Cleveland's drug-enforcement policy to that in Cincinnati, let alone Seattle.
But the differences in practice from one city or county to the next may be
huge. Similarly, to the extent that differences in policy might cause crimi-
nals to relocate, we expect them to travel as little as possible.
Fourth, the behavior at issue here-smoking crack cocaine-is not one
that is likely to be relocated because of local interjurisdictional differences
in law-enforcement policy. It's hard to imagine that black crack users from
Cleveland have responded to the policy of the Cuyahoga County prosecutor
11. Id. at 290-91.
12. Id. at 291 n.6.
13. For the most part, Teichman is aware of these issues.
14. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NUMBER OF PERSONS IN
CUSTODY OF STATE CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES BY MOST SERIOUS OFFENSE, 1980-2002, http://
www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/glance/tables/corrtyptab.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
15. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, USA COUNTIES 1990, http://censtats.census.gov/usa/
usainfo.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
16. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT STA-
TISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslawenf.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
1727June 2006]
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by driving over the border, smoking crack in the nearly all-white suburbs,
and leaving their residue-laden pipes there-or by moving to the white sub-
urbs altogether. Teichman, of course, recognizes that some types of criminal
conduct are not likely to be affected by the phenomenon he describes,' 7 and
this example is clearly in that category. We will return to this issue later.
Last, consider the policy objections that were raised by the two foreper-
sons whom Crocker describes. As Teichman points out, debates over
criminal penalties are frequently framed in terms of justice rather than deter-
rence or prevention, let alone displacement of criminal behavior." That was
certainly true here. The two objections that Crocker mentions reflect two of
the most important and common issues that come up in such debates: hori-
zontal equity-especially within a jurisdiction or between close neighbors-
and race, the elephant in the room in any discussion of criminal justice in
the United States. It's hardly news that race is a central issue to any discus-
sion of the criminal justice system in the United States, but a quick check on
the magnitude of the impact of race is in order. At the end of 2003, non-
Hispanic African Americans-who represent about 12% of the general
populationlg-made up 44% of the over 1,300,000 prisoners in state and
federal prisons; 20 Hispanics were 19%, and non-Hispanic whites, who make
21 22
up 67% of the general population, were 35% of the prison population.
Nearly 13% of African-American men between the ages of twenty-five and
twenty-nine were in jail or prison on June 30, 2004-a shocking figure--
compared to about 1.7% of white men in that age range.
The local politics and racial dynamics of criminal justice in the United
States can push policies in various directions. The crack epidemic in the late
1980s hit black communities very hard. In response, some black leaders
supported strong punitive measures to combat the use of crack cocaine, de-
23spite the fact that the affected defendants were mostly black . In most other
contexts, however, African Americans are likely to be less punitive in their
attitudes toward crime, and more skeptical of law enforcement than white
Americans. At least part of the reason is that they are much more likely than
whites to be on the receiving end of the law. Members of the law-abiding
majority of African Americans are much more likely than law-abiding
whites to have friends and relatives who have been arrested and imprisoned.
17. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1841-42.
18. Id. at 1838-39.
19. Calculated from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 4: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULA-
TION BY RACE ALONE AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES:
JULY 1, 2004, at 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2004-
04.html.
20. Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2003, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, Nov. 2004, at 1, 9, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf.
21. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 19.
22. Harrison & Beck, supra note 20, at 9.
23. See, e.g., Gary Gately, On City Street Comers, Night of Antidrug Vigils, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1986, at BI; Peter Kerr, Rising Concern on Drugs Stirs Public to Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1986, § 1, at 1.
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As a result, they are much more likely to be aware of the excesses and injus-
tices our police and courts mete out. Thus, African Americans-who are far
more likely than whites to be victimized by homicide-are nonetheless
much less likely to support the death penalty.24 This difference in attitudes
can produce equally large differences in policy. For example, the likelihood
of facing the death penalty is about thirteen times higher for a murder in the
white suburbs of Baltimore County than for a comparable killing in the pre-
dominantly black City of Baltimore."
Clearly the Cleveland crack-pipe policy that Crocker describes was not
designed to drive urban crack smokers to the Cleveland suburbs, any more
than the Baltimore murder policy was designed to drive downtown killers to
Baltimore suburbs. But was the policy of the Baltimore suburbs designed to
export homicides from the suburbs to the city or to keep them pent up there?
It's possible that the goal of the policy was to relocate homicides, of course,
but there is no evidence of it. There is certainly no evidence of a "race" be-
tween local jurisdictions to displace homicides in Maryland by increasing
the likelihood of a death sentence; Baltimore City's lenient death-penalty
policy is the standout in the state, and that appears to have been true over
time. In other words, all indications suggest that this local disparity has
nothing to do with crime displacement. Of course counties and cities do
sometimes try to prevent their neighbors from crossing their borders to
commit crimes, but the common method of choice is more direct: racial pro-
filing. They have their cops stop cars with minority drivers who cross into
their territory, and question, cite, search, or even arrest the occupants.2
6
Teichman's argument is most persuasive as applied to crimes undertaken
as part of a concerted pattern of illegal economic activity-as he notes.27 His
most convincing examples are in this category: the spread of Auto Theft
Prevention Authorities in response to organized car-theft rings, and the re-
cent spate of regulation of the sale of pseudoephedrine in response to the
proliferation of laboratories that produce illegal methamphetamine. Most
prisoners in American prisons, however, are not there for organized eco-
nomic crimes. In 2001, 49% of the 1.2 million American prisoners in state
prisons were serving terms for crimes of violence, primarily homicide
(15%), robbery (13%), sexual assault (10%), and other assaults (10%).28 It's
24. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Ameri-
cans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. OF Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 19, 20-21; Computer-
Assisted Survey Methods Program, Quick Table: GSS 1972-2004 Cumulative Datafile, http://
sda.berkeley.edu:8080/quicktables/quicksetoptions.do? reportKey=gss04%3A5 (last visited Apr. 10,
2006) (data from the General Social Survey, conducted periodically by the National Opinion Re-
search Center).
25. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH
SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION: Ex-
ECUTIVE SUMMARY 25 (2003), http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/exec.pdf.
26. Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1433 n.78 (2002).
27. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1845.
28. Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2002, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, Aug. 2003, at 1, 10, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf.
1729June 20061
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hard to believe that any noticeable fraction of these crimes could conceiva-
bly be displaced by any of the policies Teichman discusses. The same
applies to most of the 20% of prisoners serving time for property crimes-a
majority of whom were convicted of burglary (9%) or larceny (4%)-and to
the 11% convicted of "public-order" offenses, a category that includes drunk
29driving, court offenses, and morals and decency violations. Moreover, this
proportional distribution of state prisoners was roughly the same in 1980,
when there were merely 296,000 state prisoners, with one very important
exception: the percentage of prisoners convicted of drug crimes rose from
6% in 1980 to 20% in 2001.30 We will return to this issue shortly.
One of Teichman's chief examples does concern violent crime: Califor-
nia's "three-strike" habitual-criminal statute. The evidence that this law
actually does cause career criminals to migrate to other states is weak-as
Teichman puts it, "anecdotal" 3 '-but that does not matter to his argument. If
legislatures believe that this regime will drive criminals away, they may en-
act three-strikes statutes for that purpose whether or not they truly have that
effect. That qualification, however, cuts both ways. Teichman cites a study
that describes this forced migration as an "unintended but positive conse-
32quence" of California's three-strike law. To the extent that this is true, the
unintended displacement of criminals-if any-could not have been a move
in an interjurisdictional race, to the bottom or to the top.
More important, the adoption of three-strikes laws, whatever their in-
tended purposes, could not have been a major driving force behind the
horrific run-up in the rate of imprisonment in the United States over the past
two-and-a-half decades. Teichman reports that "[b]etween 1993 and 1995,
twenty-four states enacted some type of three-strike legislation. 33 And in-
deed, from 1995 through 2003, the prison population of the United States
did increase steadily, at an average annual rate of 3.4%.34 But from 1980
through 1994-before this spate of legislation could have had any notice-
able effect-the prison population increased much faster, at a staggering
average annual rate of 8.7%, 2.6 times faster than after 1994.35 This illus-
trates the central problem in Teichman's claim that interjurisdictional
competition to get rid of criminals was a cause of the increased rate of im-
prisonment: the empirical evidence he discusses does not support the claim
and suggests the opposite. Of course, it's possible that the spate of new
three-strikes laws contributed to the build up in our prison population after
1995 (assuming as well that those laws were in fact motivated by interjuris-
29. Id.
30. Id.; Allen J. Beck & Darrell K. Gilliard, Prisoners in 1994, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS BULLETIN, Aug. 1995, at 1, 11, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pi94.pdf.
31. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1847.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 1848 n.91.
34. Harrison & Beck, supra note 20, at 2.
35. Beck & Gilliard, supra note 30, at 1.
1730 [Vol. 104:1725
HeinOnline  -- 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1730 2005-2006
Jurisdictional Competition
dictional competition), but why would anyone jump to that conclusion when
the rate of increase went down rather than up after they were enacted?
What about drugs? Drug dealing is an elaborately planned economic ac-
tivity, and at least some of it-at the manufacture, importation, and
wholesale distribution levels-might well be movable from one jurisdiction
to another. In recent years, drug offenders have also constituted the fastest-
growing segment of the prison population, as noted. If policies aimed at dis-
placement of criminal behavior have contributed to the vast increase in the
rate of imprisonment, we would expect a significant portion of that contribu-
tion to consist of imprisoned drug defendants. But Teichman does not
mention drug crimes as a possible context for interjurisdictional competition
that might increase the prison population; I assume this is because he found
36
no evidence to support that contention. In fact, the evidence suggests the
opposite. Between 1980 and 2001 the number of drug offenders in state
prisons increased enormously, by a factor of thirteen."37 But the number of
drug offenders in federal custody increased even more rapidly, by a factor of
• 38
sixteen, despite the fact that the federal system, under a unitary national
government, is not subject to this sort of interjurisdictional competition-a
point Teichman discusses at length.
In fact, Teichman devotes a great deal of attention to the implications of
his thesis for federal criminal justice policy.39 He describes the national gov-
ernment as the body that could control the damaging tendencies he ascribes
to competition between local jurisdictions, and he decries the fact that cur-
rent federal policy is likely, if anything, to make those tendencies worse.
These are normative arguments, and interesting ones. But Teichman over-
looks a fundamental empirical point: The history of federal policy in the
past twenty-some years suggests that interjurisdictional competition was not
a major factor in the draconian revolution in the American system of crimi-
nal justice. Consider: from 1980 through 2001 the total population of
prisoners in state custody increased by about 300%40-a huge jump---but the
population of prisoners in federal custody grew even faster, by about
630%. 4' Since interjurisdictional competitions could not have contributed to
the federal surge, why would anyone think it was a major factor in the
36. Teichman does briefly mention studies that show that police patrol and enforcement
activities can displace a variety of crimes from one location to another nearby-retail-drug dealing
and marijuana growing, as well as prostitution, burglary, and robbery. See Teichman, supra note 3,
at 1840-41 nn.49-53 and accompanying text. This sort of displacement, however, does not increase
the rate of imprisonment.
37. There were 19,000 drug offenders in state prisons in 1980, Beck & Gilliard, supra note
30, at 11. There were 246,100 in 2001. Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2001, Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, July 2002, at 1, 10, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/p0l .pdf.
38. There were 4900 drug offenders in federal prisons in 1980, Beck & Gilliard, supra note
30, at 10. There were 78,501 in 2001. Harrison & Beck, supra note 28, at 11.
39. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1866-74.
40. See supra note 37.
41. See supra note 38.
June 2006] 1731
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contemporaneous but less extreme state buildup? Isn't it more plausible that
some of the same political and social forces that caused the federal govern-
ment to lock up more than seven times as many people in 2001 as in 1980-
despite the absence of interjurisdictional competition-also caused the
states to lock up about four times as many?
Teichman ends his article with a question: "Is the American criminal
justice system engaged in a race to the top or a race to the bottom?'"42 The
answer surely is "No." Given all the other pressures that bear on criminal
justice policy, interjurisdictional competition to displace crime does not ap-
pear to be a major force that shapes the system. But that does not detract
from the value of Teichman's article. Interjurisdictional competition does
occur, at least in pockets. It is an interesting and important issue; it could
become more important in the future, and Teichman does a good job of ex-
ploring it. I have made no attempt to summarize or repeat the many
interesting points he has made better than I could. Even a good law review
article does not have to be-and is not likely to be-a Theory of Everything.
42. Teichman, supra note 3, at 1876.
1732 [Vol. 104:1725
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